AIP18: superMAHA: Locked MAHA tokens for better incentives and stronger governance

This proposal suggests the following:

Introducing superMAHA, converting MAHA into a fee-earning asset with governance properties similar to Curve’s veCRV, Frax’s veFXS, iceCream etc…

Similar to veCRV, superMAHA will be used for voting in governance, boosting rewards, earning trading fees, and receiving airdrops.

Motivation

Curve.finance, through its veCRV token, has built one of the best token designs in the space for emission-based projects. Furthermore, over 40% of CRV’s circulating supply is locked as the veCRV token.

MAHA also has an emission rate/inflation which is set at 50,000 MAHA tokens per month over the course of 10 years. Which makes it eligible for such a model.

Furthermore, superMAHA allows MAHA holders to actively vote on where the newly minted MAHA tokens will be distributed, decentralizing the inflation of MAHA to its community.

Minting superMAHA

Assuming 1000 MAHA is vote-locked:

minted vote-locked
1000 4 years
250 1 year
127.4 6 month
63.7 3 month
21.23 1 month
4.79 1 week

How superMAHA works:

  • Lock MAHA between 1 week to 4 years to receive superMAHA.
  • superMAHA becomes non-transferable and non-tradeable.
  • Stake superMAHA and receive 25% of the ecosystem profits
  • 1 superMAHA = 1 vote in the future of MAHA governance, validators, airdrops, etc…
  • superMAHA staked translates to voting power which can be used to determine the allocation of MAHA token liquidity mining by chain and market.

This benefits MAHA ecosystem as a whole by:

  • Incentivizing farmers to stake MAHA to boost their rewards.
  • Allocate voting power to long-term holders of MAHA through superMAHA.
  • Allow superMAHA holders to partake in earning fees from the ecosystem.
  • Allow superMAHA holders to safely and securely control the inflation of MAHA tokens.

Timeline

After discussions within the community, this proposal will be put up for a vote on July 29th, 2021 at 3pm GMT for 3 days. After which the team will schedule for the release of superMAHA sometime closer to the end of August.

Relevant links:

3 Likes

This is a great addition that will greatly improve the integrity of governance. The key difference being a more direct influence rewarded to long term commitment to the project, while greatly reducing the vulnerability of short term acquisition for temporary influence.

At current, an individual can;
-Make a proposal
-Load up of cheap Maha
-Push through approval of proposal
-Sell off the Maha post-voting decision.

This means Maha is currently “governance on demand” or “temporary governance when convenient” - all of which diminishes the incentive for long term commitment over intermittent commitment, which can impact the quality of future AIP’s and their outcomes.

With this change, more leverage is given to those who Time-Lock their commitment, and in a way that can rightfully so, give more power to lesser holders who are committed for the long-term, over larger stake holders who are more interested in exiting sooner than later.

Just to explain the mechanisms here a bit more;
-The “superMaha” amount is minted instantly depending on the time-lock duration you commit too.
-For example, Time-locking 1000 Maha for 1 week will allocate to you 4.79 ‘superMaha’ instantly for use in voting. Whereas Time-locking 1000 Maha for 4 years will allocate to you 1000 ‘superMaha’ instantly for use in voting.
-After the time-lock period has expired, your Maha is returned, and your ‘superMaha’ is no longer allocated to you.

I would like to suggest with this that we include the follow;
-Maha Oracles not only require 10,000 Maha to operate, but this 10,000 Maha should be time/vote-locked for a set criteria of time.
-Maha used for Incubator perks/discounts should also be time/vote-locked for a set criteria of time.

In addition, if this proposal is approved - I’d like to suggest that all powers of governance be shifted over to ‘superMaha’.

Lastly, maybe a better brand name than ‘superMaha’ :smiley:
-MahaX

Looking forward to seeing this, but would be well timed to move on when more maha pairs/liquidity options are listed, and overall crypto market sentiment is confidently bullish.

1 Like

Assuming that ARTHX does transition to be a fee bearing token, we will have two assets in the ecosystem (superMAHA and ARTHX) that allows users to earn protocol fees.

Would not cause these tokens to fight each other?
How you do you keep ARTHX atractive for investors?

I would think that ARTHX should be the token that earns the most protocol fees and superMAHA will boost the rewards on top of it along with all the utility described in the proposal.

1 Like

This would be a kind of layer 2 for the Maha Token, if I understand this correctly. It seems to me that two things are important to clarify / discuss:

  1. I consider it useful to limit the maximum voting power per individual. E.g. that nobody can have more than 10% of the total voting power. The aim should be to distribute votes among as many as possible, without one person alone being able to outvote all the others just because he can afford it.

  2. The distribution of fees should be clearly defined. As far as I understand, once the dept pool is paid off, 50% of all fees go to Arthx, 25% to Maha-Staker and 25% to the organisation or token burn (for Maha burn, development, marketing etc.). If I take it from AIP18 correctly, then if it is approved, the 25% Maha-Staker share would simply go to the superMaha holders. Correct?

1 Like

Ok , so of maha is time- locked. Yes maha will moon and governance will be concentrated among committed holders . But this could come at the cost of following.

  1. Could too much maha be extract from LP’s leaving us with a liquidity crunch.
    2.We are yet to learn the mechanism of how oracle works with require 10k maha. Can this time locked maha too be considered to run a node.

Finally I would suggest for allocation and priority of incubated projects, priority should be given to those who lock for 4 years. In addition to a slab based allocation system, any unallocated could be assigned to the next slab in the hierarchy.

1 Like
  • For superMaha there should simply be only 1 pool or the 25% fee share should be distributed by airdrop. As simple and concentrated as possible. Exchange superMaha once and deposit it in only on one place, if necessary, and that’s it. Not like Arthx, where the 25% is spread over various staking and farming pools.

  • I like the bigger gap from 1 year to 4 years. It really shows who is backing Maha in the long run. It makes it more interesting than if there is also a 2 year option. The challenge with 4 years is simply whether it is possible to keep tokens safe for 4 years (you can’t move them around). With all the technical progress, hacks, exploits, updates and so on, this is certainly a risk.

  • It would be interesting, if 4-year superMAHA stakers would receive a certain percentage of tokens from each IDO via airdrops. Like the highest tiers of various launch pads.

  • I prefer superMAHA over MahaX.

  • The locket Maha or superMAHA, do they also earn MAHA (API) or only fees?